Welcome to the third installment of “The Academic Worker,” where we have been kicking things off with a focused miniseries on tenure, arguably higher education’s most controversial practice. For outsiders looking into the ivory tower, the institution of tenure frequently sparks bewilderment, skepticism, and debate. To bridge the gap between academic traditions and public perception, it helps to address the two questions about tenure that probably matter most to skeptical or merely confused nonacademics: Why should a professor have more job security than the average worker? And are there any limits on what tenure actually allows a professor to do?

These are undeniably big questions, and exploring them within the confines of a brief column means distilling complex labor dynamics into accessible concepts. Yet, untangling these inquiries is essential for understanding how modern universities function, how knowledge is produced, and how the broader workforce operates.

To tackle the first question—why professors should enjoy above-average job security—we must first look at the broader economic landscape. Last month, our discussion centered on tenure as a specialized variety of just-cause contracts, noting that this status makes tenured employment one of many notable exceptions to the at-will work default. Because the at-will rule governs an estimated 70 to 80 percent of the United States workforce, tenure stands out as an exception to the exception. Given this stark contrast, it is entirely fair for outsiders to ask what is so exceptional about professors that warrants such robust protections.

Over the course of academic debates and public forums, several core justifications emerge to explain this enduring practice.

The first and most frequently cited justification is academic freedom. This principle usually takes precedence because scholars depend on it to protect their professional livelihoods, though its persuasive power among the public seems to vary depending on the day of the week and political party affiliation. Regardless of fluctuating public sentiment, the foundational idea behind academic freedom is that professors must be able to teach, research, and publish controversial or unpopular ideas without fear that doing so will cost them their livelihoods. Both character development in pedagogical tasks and genuine breakthroughs in scholarly tasks sometimes require direct engagement with controversial or unpopular subjects. Professors need the institutional protection of tenure so they can perform the core jobs they were hired to do, challenging students and expanding human understanding without self-censorship.

The second justification revolves around recruitment and workforce retention. Historical analysis shows that tenure likely spread because university administrators viewed it as a vital employment incentive during eras of booming enrollments when qualified professors were in exceptionally short supply. Historically, universities could not—or simply would not—match the financial compensation offered by private industry, but the long-term job security of tenure offered potential hires something else of tangible value.

While society no longer operates within that post-war boom era, higher education institutions still face the ongoing necessity of recruiting new talent. Society expects young people to be educated by qualified, committed scholars, and expects critical research to be undertaken by individuals who are not wholly beholden to short-term market logics. These societal goals persist even though the financial implications of pursuing a career in higher education are increasingly bleak. Professors in many academic disciplines routinely take significant pay cuts to work in academia, making choices that inflict irreversible damage on their long-term personal financial health. For this reason, tenure remains an indispensable recruitment tool to attract brilliant minds into a structurally undercompensated field.

The third pillar supporting tenure involves knowledge production and professional training. Research of all kinds is inherently slow, unpredictable, and risky; time, money, and effort spent in a laboratory or archive do not guarantee immediate results. Currently, universities dominate pre-commercial research. While this centralized arrangement may not be an ideal model for every aspect of the modern economy, it remains the reigning reality. Tenure incentivizes individuals to choose lengthy, expensive advanced education leading to a lesser-paying job where they might toil for years over intractable problems that the commercial market has no interest in solving, yielding unreliable or intangible results to report.

Furthermore, universities train the vast majority of professionals capable of producing advanced knowledge, while also educating the very people who do your taxes, operate on your body, write your legal will, and design your architectural home. While alternative methods for training professionals and producing nonmarketable knowledge might exist, as long as society relies on universities to fulfill these complex tasks—and as long as universities rely on underpaying highly credentialed workers—tenure provides the necessary incentive for career choices that directly bear on the public interest.

The final major justification concerns institutional operations and survival. Observers frequently hear that tenure facilitates shared governance by allowing employees to pursue the long-term good of the profession or the institution despite intense peer pressure and the looming possibility of employer retaliation. What is frequently forgotten in these debates is that shared governance ultimately benefits the institution far more than the individual employee. This dynamic is especially critical today, with the looming specter of artificial intelligence reshaping the educational landscape.

Institutional survival in the age of artificial intelligence will likely turn on two distinct capabilities: persuading students and financial sponsors of a university’s research excellence, and convincing them of the institution’s distinct ability to facilitate deep personal growth rather than mere automated knowledge accumulation. The employees with the specialized skill or professional obligation to undertake this demanding work—and to ensure it is performed thoroughly and ethically rather than expediently or quickly—do so to the profound benefit of their institutional employers.

Moving from the first major inquiry to the second, the discussion naturally shifts to whether there are any actual limits on what tenure allows professors to do.

Many professors will readily reply that tenure does not protect against the severe consequences of illegal or unethical behavior, such as sexual misconduct, workplace bullying, harassment, financial fraud, or theft. According to every professor familiar with institutional policy, tenure is certainly no shield against legitimate, well-documented charges of these types.

However, that standard response conceals a great deal of nuance and fails to address what the skeptical nonacademic is truly asking. What the public really wants to know is whether tenure allows professors to conduct their jobs however they see fit, entirely free from adverse employment consequences or administrative oversight. Most ordinary workers enjoy no such level of professional freedom, a reality cemented by the U.S. Supreme Court in its 2006 rulings regarding the speech rights of public employees. Consequently, critics naturally ask why professors should be held to a different standard.

To illustrate this tension, consider a recent high-profile case: Should tenure allow Michel DeGraff, an expert on Creole languages at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, to teach a specialized class on linguistics and decolonization in Israel and Palestine over the explicit objections of his faculty colleagues, as expressed through internal departmental approval processes?

DeGraff maintains that his tenure explicitly permits this academic autonomy, stating publicly that MIT should not be repressing his teaching in that manner. Conversely, his faculty colleagues argue that the proposed course material lies well outside his established field of scholarly expertise.

Navigating this dispute highlights a deeper, persistent challenge within higher education: defining an academic’s scholarly expertise is often surprisingly difficult. This ambiguity exists partly because genuine expertise evolves and expands over time. If a scholar is truly committed to the ethos of lifelong learning, they will naturally learn new things on new topics, rather than simply accumulating more information on the same narrow topic they studied in graduate school. Yet, a professor engaged in this intellectual evolution will not always have new formal credentials to show for it.

For that reason and others, institutional credentials frequently serve as poor proxies for actual expertise. The same limitation applies to academia’s traditional coin of the realm, peer-reviewed publications. While the full scope of that argument requires more space than a microcinema-style column permits, DeGraff touches on a valid point: he may well possess the broader intellectual expertise needed to teach such a class.

Even so, the critical question remains: does he possess an absolute right to teach it?

This is precisely where opinions diverge, and where some academics may depart from the consensus of their peers. One can argue that an individual professor does not possess an inherent right to execute their job in any manner they see fit, regardless of the valid objections of equally expert colleagues. At the same time, professors certainly maintain significantly more professional latitude than many traditional workers when it comes to defining what "doing the job" actually entails. That extra autonomy is not an absolute luxury; it is a functional necessity required to perform the complex, independent work academic institutions were founded to foster. Yet, extra autonomy is by no means complete autonomy. Achieving total autonomy would require an academic to operate as an independently wealthy scholar beholden to no institution.

Academics are, at their core, workers. Navigating the modern economy means recognizing that workers experience varying degrees of professional autonomy and job security. Professors require a substantial measure of both to carry out their complex responsibilities effectively. However, for any professional who relies on collecting a regular paycheck and depends on the collaborative scaffolding provided by others—including students, administrative staff, and faculty colleagues—the reality remains clear: they are workers laboring alongside and for people beyond themselves. Those people matter deeply, and tenure matters deeply. Both statements are simultaneously and equally true.

Deepa Das Acevedo is an associate professor at Emory Law and the author of The War on Tenure, published by Cambridge University Press.